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THOMAS HOBBES AND THE LAW*
J.H. Hextert
Sometime between 1662 and 1675, somewhere between the
ages of 74 and 87, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote
his Dialogue Between a Philosopherand a Student of the Common Laws
of England.' It is a rather misbegotten effort. It is not at all clear
whether the Dialogue is an unfinished book or a very nearly
finished one, the sort of thing, after all, that one can ordinarily
tell about a well-wrought book or a well-wrought fragment of a
book.2 To leave matters in such disarray is not at all characteristic of Hobbes. In most of his books he uses an early page or two
to tell the reader just what to expect, what not to expect and
why. 3 But then windy, inept and unpersuasive books are not
* This Article was originally presented as part of the Cornell University Society for
the Humanities' Distinguished Visitors Program on November 8, 1979.
t B.A. 1931, University of Cincinnati; M.A. 1933, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1937,
Harvard University. Distinguished Historian in Residence at Washington University; Charles J.
Still6 Professor of History Emeritus at Yale University, Director of the Yale Center for
Parliamentary History.
T. HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON
LAWS OF ENGLAND

(J.

Cropsey ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DIALOGUE].

2 On this point, the work's most recent editor, Joseph Cropsey, is only willing "to
suggest provisionally that the substance of the Dialogue is not grossly incompatible with the
termination of the work on the theme of Parliament, as it now in fact closes." Cropsey,
Introduction to DIALOGUE, supra note 1, at 9-10. This is the sort of suggestion that one rarely
has to make in the case of books properly and seemly put together. Cropsey is perhaps
over-inclined to find significant changes in Hobbes' thought manifested in the DIALOGUE.
Thus he considers Hobbes' rather grudging concession about the way the King of England
actually made law during the Restoration a muted "view ...of a collaborative regimeking, Lords, and Commons." Id. at 48. It is evident enough, however, that this collaboration is merely at the King's will and that he could lawfully abolish it.
3 See T. HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC, at xiv-xvi (F. T6nnies
ed. 1889) [hereinafter cited as ELEMENTS]; T. HOBBES, DE CIVE OR THE CITIZEN 1-18 (S.
Lamprecht ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as DE CIvE]; T. HOBBS, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME AND

POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH

ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 5-6 (M.

Oakeshott ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as LEVIATHAN].
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characteristic of Hobbes either. Yet the Dialogue is a windy, inept
and unpersuasive attack on the common law and its
practitioners-the barristers at the bar, and the judges on the
bench. In this long diatribe, Hobbes makes assertions about the
laws of England that are singularly irrelevant to the actuality. He
claims, for example, that Chancery rightfully has appellate jurisdiction in error over all the common law courts, 4 that royal proclamations have the binding force of statute, 5 that it is proper for
the King personally to sit as judge on the bench of any of his
courts. 6 Hobbes indulges in long and boring erudite disquisitions
on such antiquities and arcana as the origin of the term "chancery" 7 and the etymology of the word "felony." 8 Hobbes' sole apparent purpose is to insult the learning of Sir Edward Coke, the
great commentator on the common law, dead and buried for
more than thirty years. Hobbes spends an inordinate amount of
the Dialogue engrossed in a ritual exorcism of the great Sir Edward, uttering shrill shrieks of contempt almost every time he
mentions Coke's name, which for a reader not attuned to intellectual shrillness is too often.' Unfortunately for the force of Hobbes'
recurrent diatribe, he all too frequently misstates the particular
argument of Coke that he is attacking 1 ° or misunderstands Coke's
point altogether. I'
In fact Hobbes does not have a philosophic temper suited to
the dialogue form. Plato had enough of the exploring inquirer
about him to write dialogues in which there was both dialectic
tension between the participants and shared discovery of ideas. In
Hobbes' Dialogue the common lawyer has three roles; none lends
itself to the type of creative conflict that the Platonic dialectic
sometimes achieved. First, the lawyer is a source of information
to the Philosopher on details of the law-provisions of statutes,
customs of the courts, and views of common lawyers on the law.
Second, he is a straight man for the Philosopher, feeding him
remarks that allow him to get off telling ripostes. And third, he is
I

DIALOGUE, supra note 1, at 86-87.

5 Id. at 71.
6 Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 91-93.
8 Id. at 110-12.
9 See, e.g., id. at 135, 136, 143, 148.
10 See id. at 107 & n.16.
" See, e.g., id. at 96 ("1 wonder why Sir Edw. Coke should cite [an expired statute] ...
unless he did it on purpose to diminish (as he endeavors to do throughout his Institutes)
the Kings Authority") (emphasis in original).
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an echo, remarking at the end of several particularly harsh assaults
by the Philosopher that he has felt similarly all along, but has
hesitated to say so for fear of the wrath of his professional colleagues. It is all too clear in the Dialogue that Hobbes has foolishly
stacked the deck so that the Philosopher always wins but never
encounters the kind of tough opposition the common lawyers
were actually capable of putting up; his opposition is never more
than a clumsy canvas-back stooge.
So in the Dialogue, his wordy and unpersuasive attack on the
Common Law and its practitioners, that ordinarily clear-headed
man, Thomas Hobbes, stumbled angrily and ineptly on and on.
To engage him that strongly, to reduce him to intellectual spluttering, he must have found something about the law and the
lawyers that, as we would say today, was threatening, that imperiled something that he held most dear. Now there is little
doubt about what Hobbes held most dear: the philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes and the belief that Thomas Hobbes was the best
and most important philosopher to come along since Plato and
Aristotle-or perhaps since time began. And if Hobbes believed
that the common law-and the things men like Sir Edward Coke
thought about it-threatened Hobbes' philosophy and his exalted
self-estimate, he was right.
Hobbes was the creator of a system of philosophy, one of the
few systems that was an exception to Whitehead's rule: all
philosophy since Plato's time are but footnotes to Plato. Hobbes'
system of philosophy was not systematic in the sense that it made
a statement about the substance of all things knowable in an
Aristotelian-Baconian fashion. Rather, it dealt in an integral way
with three major interrelated philosophical problems: the nature
of things and their movements; the nature of man alone and his
desires; the nature of man in society and his reason.
It was not the systematic character of his philosophy that was
closest to Hobbes' heart. He vigorously pursued the creation of
such a system off and on for two decades, roughly from sometime
in the 1630s to sometime in the 1650s.1 2 But his vigor was not
matched by persistence. To deal with the exigencies of matters in

12 In this estimate I accept the argument of J.N. Watkins that a manuscript by Hobbes
in the Harleian collection (B. L., Harleian Ms. 6796, fols. 297-308), published by Ferdinand
T6nnies as an appendix to the Elements, antedates the latter work. See Watkins, Philosophy
and Politics in Hobbes in HoBBES STUDIES 239-42 (K. Brown ed. 1965). Clearly the manuscript was intended as a preliminary sketch of the elements of natural philosophy.
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his view more pressing than the rounding out of a philosophical
system, he was ready to postpone the perfecting of his work. His
sense of priorities led him to compose two treatises on moral and
political man-The Elements of Law and Leviathan-and one on
political man alone-De Give-before he published his work on
the movements of things in nature.13
Hobbes thus shifted his intellectual course because, just as he
began to apply himself to his philosophic task, the whole frame of
civil society in England suffered a terrifying tremor. In 1642 that
long tremor eventuated in a catastrophic collapse of civil order
that lasted for seven years. The structure of politics was temporarily stabilized in 1649 only by means of the masked dictatorship of
a conquering army and its general. To most men of active mind
in those days the call to think hard about the minimal conditions
of civil order and how to attain them must have rung loud and
strong. It was especially strong to Hobbes; in him it struck a
sounding board tuned by a special circumstance to respond powerfully to the threat of political anarchy. That circumstance was
his perception of his place in the major intellectual transformation
of his time, the transformation that in our day we identify as the
Scientific Revolution.
In 1655 Hobbes summarized in De Corpore what he saw as
the three seminal intellectual events that brought about the Scientific Revolution and heralded a new era of the human spirit. Out
of the murk of ageless human ignorance,
Galileus in our time ... was the first that opened to us the gate
of natural philosophy universal, which is the knowledge of the
nature of motion. So that neither can the age of natural
philosophy be reckoned higher than to him .... [T]he science
of man's body . .. was first discovered with admirable sagacity by
... Doctor Harvey.... [Tihese, astronomy and natural
philosophy ... have, for so little time, been extraordinarily advanced .... Natural Philosophy is therefore but young; but
Civil Philosophy yet much younger, as being no older ... than
my ...

De Cive. 14

'3 Hobbes wrote the Elements of Law in or before 1640, De Give in 1642, Leviathan by
1651. He seems to have delayed finishing his De Corpore until years after he had written De
Give, which he considered the third and final part of his summa, which was also to include
De Homine. He specifically mentioned England's political crisis as a justification for turning
to De Cive, out of order, in 1642. DE GIVE, supra note 3, at 14-15.
14 T. HOBBES, Epistle Dedicatory to William Earl of Devonshire, in ELEMENTS OF
PHILOSOPHY, reprinted in I THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES at viii-ix (W. Molesworth ed. 1840) [hereinafter cited as ENGLISH WORKS].
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So Hobbes saw his new philosophy of politics as the last step
toward the perfection of a bright new way of knowing, superior to
all the dull feeble old ways and sure to displace them, as Galileo's
new science of motion was to displace Aristotle's, as Harvey's new
science of the human body was to displace Galen's. The agonies of
the English political order, which first coincided with and then
extended beyond the years during which Hobbes was originating
and amplifying his theory of the state, provided him with an ongoing horrid confirmation of the correctness of his civil
philosophy.
Not that Hobbes had much faith in such experiential confirmation. Nor, indeed, that he needed it. He had better grounds
than experience for his assurance that his civil philosophy opened
a new path to truth through the wilderness of error. He knew
that the path was right because it ran parallel to the one that
Galileo had taken to the truth about motion of inert bodies, to the
one that Harvey had taken to the truth about the movements of
the heart and blood. His theory of state was right, Hobbes believed, because his method of arriving at it was right; it was the
method of Galileo and Harvey. Hobbes sought to make his
method clear in the dedicatory epistles to his first two completed
works, The Elements of Law and De Cive. Taking the arguments of
those two letters together with a little help from Behemoth, 15 we
get a result something like this:
What men hold for learning proceeds from two parts of their
nature: mathematical from reason, dogmatical from passion. The
former learning goes on free from dispute because it deals with
figures and external motions only; dogmatic learning, however, is
immersed in doubt and dispute because it concerns men's internal
motions or passions. 16 For men to live as they have, with all that
concerns them immersed in uncertainty and dispute is a terrible
thing, but there is a solution: to apply to man not the dogmatical
learning that passion fosters but the reason of mathematical learning. "[W]hatsoever things they are in which this present age doth
differ from the rude simpleness of antiquity, we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe merely to geometry."'I7 To bring

15 T.

HOBBES,

BEHEMOTH: THE HISTORY OF THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WARS OF ENG-

LAND [hereinafter cited as BEHEMOTH], in VI ENGLISH WORKS, supra note 14, at 161.
ELEMENTS, supra note 3, at xv.
E6
'

DE CIVE, supra note 3, at 3.
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learning about civil matters up to the level of mathematical learning, we must reason about man and his passions as geometers do
about figures and their forms so that we may know "the nature of
human actions as distinctly" as we know "the nature of quantity in
geometrical figures." 1 8 To bring this about, "[t]o reduce this doctrine to the rules and infallibility of reason, there is no way, but
first to put such principles down for a foundation, as passion not
mistrusting, may not seek to displace, and afterward to build
thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature ... by degrees, till
the whole be inexpugnable."' 9 Thus Hobbes would begin with
axioms so clear that none would deny them and then reason from
them in so sure, so "geometric" a way that the political conclusions
he derived would be invincible, certain conclusions rigorously
drawn from indubitable premises.
Hitherto among all the writers on moral philosophy, not one
had found the correct starting place or used, as Hobbes put it,
"an idoneous principle of tractation; ' ' 20 that is, no one had treated
moral philosophy in accord with a proper and fitting rule. The
problem for the philosopher is to find "a certain clue of reason,"
a clear and distinct idea or two, and to reason from them more
geometrico, for only thus will he achieve certainty. Since he
reasoned on the foundation of a few clear and distinct ideas,
Hobbes thereby erected, he believed, a philosophy of the civil
state that ended not with the interminable debate on that subject
already in progress for two millenia, but with certainty. One such
idea was that before there is a civil state every man has the
natural right to do what he believes will save himself from violence at the hands of others. From the exercise of this right flows
contention "and from that contention all kind of calamities must
unavoidably ensue," a war of each against each. 2 1 The second
idea was that the first law of nature informs every man's reason,
that for his preservation he "ought to endeavor peace." Reasoning
more geometrico from these two clear and distinct ideas, all the rest
follows. Since in the state of nature, in which every man has a
right to do as he will, none achieves or ever can achieve peace, by
the law of nature all men ought to be ready to surrender their

18 Id.

supra note 3, at xv.
DE GIVE, supra note 3, at 4.
21 Id. at 5. Earlier versions of the justly famous chapter 13 of Leviathan, describing the
19 ELEMENTS,
20

horrors of the state of nature are in Elements, part 1, chapter 19, and De Cive, chapter 1.
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liberty if it will enable them to escape the horrors of that state.
The civil state comes into being at the instant that, by mutual
agreement or by conquest, men surrender all their natural selfdestructive right to a sovereign, who then alone has the right to
do what he will. His subjects receive back from the sovereign so
much right or liberty as he chooses to allow them. They thereby
enter into a civil state and enjoy the benefit of the peace that the
sovereign provides and their complete submission alone makes
possible. What the sovereign commands is law; whatever his
command, it assigns to each subject what is due to each. That is,
he gives each subject justice, his due, for justice is whatever the
sovereign commands, injustice a deviation from that command.
Between the late 1630s and 1642 then, Hobbes set out not
only his substantive political philosophy but also the method
which assured him that he had arrived at a new and, for the first
time in history, a true account of every man's rights and duties.
For the rest of his life he did not falter in his faith in either the
substance or the method of his philosophy. He reaffirmed that
faith in Behemoth, a work of his last years:
You may perhaps think a man has need of nothing else to
know the duty he owes to his governor, and what right he has
to order him, but a good natural wit; but it is otherwise. For it
is a science, and built upon sure and clear principles, and to be
learned by deep and careful study, or from masters that have
deeply studied it [and] who ... could find out those evident
principles, and derive from them the necessary rules of justice
22
and the necessary connexion of justice and peace?
And who could find those rules? Who, indeed, but Thomas
Hobbes? No wonder the common lawyers threw Thomas Hobbes
into a spluttering rage. They denied that he knew the rules. They
denied that his evident principles were more evident or binding
on the reason than a number of other principles. They denied
that his rules of justice were logically necessary or politically and
morally sound. They denied that the common law was merely the
will of the sovereign.
In the very first section of the Dialogue, "Of the Law of
Reason," Hobbes identified this point of unresolvable conflict between himself and the lawyers.2 3 Since in his view the law of
England is the command of the royal sovereign, and nothing but
22 BEHEMOTH, supra note 15, at 362.
23 DIALOGUE, supra note 1, at 53-57.
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that, the place to find law is the statute book where the present
commands of England's sovereign king are collected. Moreover,
since the duty of every subject is- to obey all the commands of the
sovereign that apply to him, his appropriate use of reason with
respect to law consists in studying the statutes to learn what the
sovereign has commanded, that he may better obey. As with the
king's subjects, so with the king's judges. Their duty is simply to
use their natural reason to understand what the words of the statutes mean, surely no great matter; a thing, says Hobbes casually,
that men bright enough to be judges should readily be able to do
with a month or two of study. 2 4 Then they will be ready to impose due penalties on the unjust, that is, those who disobey. Justice will be done, each receiving his due.
Hobbes' words were a gauntlet thrown down at the feet of
the common lawyers. To leave no doubt as to his intention to
insult, both in Leviathan 25 and in the Dialogue26 he quoted from
Sir Edward Coke a passage that epitomized all that Hobbes found
objectionable in the pretensions of men of law. Nothing that is
contrary to reason is lawful, said Coke:
Nihil quod est contra rationem est licitum; for reason is the life of

the law, nay the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason;
which is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason,
gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of
every man's naturall reason; for, Nemo nascitur artifex. This
legall reason est summa ratio. And therefore if all the reason that
is dispersed into so many severall heads, were united into one,
yet could he not make such a law as the law in England is; because many successions of ages it hath beene fined and refined
by an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long
experience growne to such a perfection, for the government of
this realme, as the old rule may be justly verified of it, Neminem
oportet esse sapientiorem legibus: no man out of his own private
reason, ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection
of reason. 27
Hobbes rejected the whole of Coke's statement: the law may call
for much study as do all arts, said Hobbes, but "that the Reason
which is the Life of the Law should be not Natural, but Artificial I
cannot conceive." 2 8 Coke's claim that "the law hath been fined by
24

Id. at 56.

21 LEVIATHAN,

supra note 3, at 176.

2' DIALOGUE, supra note 1, at 54-55.
27 E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
28 DIALOGUE,

supra note 1, at 55.

*97b.
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grave and learned men," the professors of the law, is manifestly
untrue, since the law is whatever the King chooses to command,
nothing more, nothing less. That in making law the King deploys
his natural reason is to be desired and assumed but not to be
required by his subjects or any human authority. Left unstated by
Hobbes was the grounds for his summary dismissal of the claims
of the artifical reason of the common law. As Coke and all its
other eulogists said, long experience was the principle validator of
that reason. In Hobbes' view, experience by its very nature fell
pitifully short of providing the certainty needed to assure men of
what they entered civil society to gain-peace.
Hobbes, perhaps unknowingly, was replaying a famous scene
of some six decades past between James I and Coke, the Chief
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. In 1607, with prompting
from the Archbishop of Canterbury, James had suggested that
"the King may take what causes he shall please to determine from
the determination of the Judges, and may determine them himself." Coke had responded that "the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case ... concerning his inheritance ... but this
ought to be determined and adjudged in some Court of Justice
according to the law and custom of England."
[T]he King said, that he thought the law was founded upon
reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the
Judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it was, that
God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great
endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the
laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life,
or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to
be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and
judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study
and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance
of it: that the law was the golden met-wand and measure to try
the causes of the subjects; and which protected His Majesty in
safety and peace: with which the King was greatly offended,
and said, that then he should be under law, which was treason
to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, quod
29
Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege.

"For the King should not be under man but under God and the
law." Or as all the chief judges of the high courts were officially to
affirm three years later, "the King hath no prerogative, but that
' ' 30
which the law of the land allows him.
29 Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Coke 63, 63-65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1342-43 (1608).
30 Proclamations, 12 Coke 74, 76, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352, 1354 (1611).
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Thus, thirty years before Hobbes had discovered his new science of politics, the judges of England had rejected its primary
substantive conclusion-that in England the King was sovereign
above the law and therefore had arbitrary right to make and unmake law at his will. At the same time that the judges had rejected
the substance of Hobbes' politics, they had repudiated his new
scientific method of relying on natural reason. Denying the viability of natural reason, the path from Hobbes' general premises to
his conclusion about the law, they raised between the two a wall of
the law called artificial reason.
A few years after Hobbes wrote the Dialogue, Matthew Hale,
31
a learned judge and legal scholar, addressed himself to it.
Through his critique he aimed to show that Hobbes was wrong
about sovereignty and reason of law. For our purposes we want to
follow Hale's argument only on the second point.
Reason, says Hale, is a word used in three ways. It can be
applied, objectively, we might say, to entities in the world outside
us-geometric figures, the heavenly bodies, the animal kingdom,
rhetoric, a body of law. So applied it refers to the orderliness or
coherence of the entity in question, that is, its reason or rationality. In that sense we may intelligibly refer to the internal relations
of the parts or members of the entity as rational, as the motions
of the planets in the solar system are, as the circulatory system is.
Second, subjectively we might say, we may use the word reason to
refer to the faculty or capacity of men to think coherently and
acquire knowledge, a faculty which although common to men is
not equally shared among them. Third, reason is understood,
"complexedly when the reasonable facultie is in Conjunction with
the reasonable Subject, and habituated to it by Use and Exercise." 3 2 Given equality in the natural faculty of reason in a group
of men, it is evident that the man who is better practiced in the
reason or coherence or system of geometry, or astronomy, or law
will be a better geometer, or astronomer, or lawyer, than men who
are less practiced. This is because the practiced man has acquired
a superior artificial reason.
31

M.

HALE, REFLECTIONS BY THE

Lrd.

CHIEFE JUSTICE HALE ON MR. HOBBES His

(Harleian Ms.), printed in 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 500 (1924). It is perhaps a symptom of their difference in outlook (and of
Hobbes' mistake) that Hale gave almost equal space to "Law in General and the Laws of
Reason" and to "Of Soveraigne Power," while in the Dialogue Hobbes allows only one-fifth
of the space to "Of the Law of Reason" that he allots to "Of Soveraigne Power."
' HALE, supra note 31, at 501.
DIALOGUE OF THE LAWE
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Hale observed that there is no area "of So greate a difficulty
the
Faculty of reason to guide it Selfe and come to any Stedfor
diness as that of Laws, for the regulation and Ordering of Civill
Societies and for the measureing of right and wrong." 3 3 Although "the C-mon Notion of Just and fitt" is shared by "all men
of reason, 3 4 there is no common consent about particulars. In
such matters, Plato and Aristotle differ, the laws of different
states differ, and men with just claims to be men of reason disagree with one another, each able to shatter the arguments of
others but not to sustain his own. So, while it is notorious that
men widely experienced in human affairs and daily doings make
good judges, men of great reason and general learning in moral
philosophy "are most Cmonly the worst Judges that can be, because they are transported from the Ordinary Measures of right
and wrong by their over fine Speculacons ... above the C-mon
Staple of humane Conversations. 3 5 When judges have no other
rule to guide and control their judgment than their own reason,
they will incline to be corrupt and partial. In particular matters,
because of the instability of natural reason, they will end in jangling contradiction.
Fortunately judges do have support more stable than the
natural reason of the individual. They have a body of doctrine
drawn from the painful lifelong studies of many students of the
law, the fruit of their reflection and reasoning on a host of particular cases, a body coherent and consistent despite its complexity.
This is the reason of the common law, the work of the practitioners who plead in the courts, of the judges who make decisions there, and of the Parliaments that-with the advice given by
those learned in the law-rectify those parts of the law that need
modification.
Thus the corporate, deliberate reason of law prevents the excesses that natural reason, turned loose on the rules by which men
live, would perpetrate. It spares both rules and men from "the
unknowne arbitrary, uncertaine Judgement of the uncertaine
reason of particular Persons." 3 6 The common law in its fundamental assumptions and requirements frees men from the reasonable fears they would have if each particular case were decided

33 Id. at 502.

34 Id.
35 Id. at 503.
36 Id.

482

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:471

according to the natural reason of each judge. It reduces that terrible uncertainty of individual reason by requiring that the judges
be learned in the law of the land and aware of judgments in preceding like cases. It requires those who profess the law to respect
the body of precedents established, refined, and corrected over
time by judges of like learning, and a like devotion to seeing justice done, as near as may be, through the common law. The
reason of the common law is founded on the experience of the
hundreds and thousands of men who over many generations have
studied it in all its complexity and with a due concern to maintain
for the common good its internal coherence, congruity and certainty. These men, however sharp their wits, have learned to bend
their natural reason in deference to the reason of the law in
which is imbedded the best reasoning of generations of students
and judges, tried by time over the centuries. For, Hale concludes:
... Long Experience makes more discoveries touching conveni-

ences or Inconveniences of Laws then is possible for the wisest
Councill of Men att first to forsee. ...

[Tlhose amendmts and

Supplemts that through the various Experiences of wise and
knowing men have been applyed to any Law must needs be
better suited to the Convenience of Laws, then the best Invention of the most pregnant witts not ayded by Such a Series and
37
tract of Experience.

This is Hale's answer to Hobbes on the issue of the reality and
value of reason of law. Reason of law not only exists, says Hale, it
affects the whole of what we today might call the rest of social
reality, or of what Montesquieu would have called the spirit of the
laws. Its roots lie in experience.
It seems to me that in terms of rational demonstration, the
Hobbes-Hale debate reached an impasse. Given Hobbes' assumptions about the nature of man, deductive reasoning leads, ineluctibly perhaps, to his conclusion that in order to insure the peace
that men are bound to seek, laws must be the commands of the
sovereign. To all such laws, they who have bound themselves together as parts of the great Leviathan owe obedience. Or at least
it leads so near to Hobbes' conclusion that Locke and Rousseau
had to cheat a little to evade it. By the same token, from his long
service as a judge in England's highest courts, Hale knew that
there was more to the common law than ever got into Hobbes'
Dialogue, or even into the statute books. The expanse of the com" Id. at 504 (footnote omitted).

1980]

HOBBES AND THE LAW

mon law resulted from the reflection of judge after judge, on case
after case, helped in such reflection by lawyer after lawyer, each
lawyer making the most reasonable case he could on one side of
an issue, and all bringing to each case their knowledge and long
experience of the law. The common law was thus an enormous,
patterned, always changing yet most stable mosaic, the whole of
which lay beyond the grasp of any one man's reason, yet all parts
of which were congruent and coherent with all the other parts.
They were kept so by the continuous application to them by practitioners and judges of the artificial reason of law, that is of all the
complex yet understandable things they knew about the law by
long consideration and study of it, including their awareness that
for the welfare and security of those subject to the law, it must be
intelligible and certain.
The difference between Hobbes and Hale represents in a
particular instance a divergence that penetrates to the very roots
of man's perception of social reality and the way to know it.
Hobbes and Hale confront one another with utterly irreconcilable
views of how to go about finding the truth concerning men and
their ways. Hobbes' way is deductive, generalizing, mechanical and
mathematical in aspiration if not in form, seeking to achieve by
those traits a certainty which is in no other way attainable. Men,
reduced from their apparent intricacy to the essential simplicity of
their true nature, their passions and their reason, are calculable
atoms, the consequences of whose movements in a determined
universe can be computed with something close to the certainty
that Galileo achieved in computing the rate of movement of
bodies in free fall. What we see in Hobbes then is an early,
perhaps the very first, attempt to apply systematically to man the
method of investigation that had but a few decades earlier won its
first conclusive triumphs in the study of nature. Hobbes may have
been the first powerful mind in the history of thought to be
seized by the dazzling vision of a unified science capable of dealing mathematically with the physicial world and man, and of
achieving the same certainty, or nearly so, about the latter as
about the former. 38

38 Hobbes' aspiration toward and belief in the possibility of attaining a certainty in
moral philosophy equivalent to that in natural philosophy separated him from all his predecessors, including Plato, Aristotle, and the scholastics. His own sense of the heightened
certainty attained in natural philosophy through application of the methods of astronomers
and physiologists makes his aspirations for political philosophy all the more exalted.
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Over the past three centuries that vision has suffered periods
of attentuation. The Romantic philosophers of the early
nineteenth century preferred a less stark, more woolly vision of
politics. In the twentieth century, in the hands of men with arbitrary sovereign power beyond Hobbes' dream, the attempt to mold
the human creature to fit the conclusions of one human science
or another has gotten itself something of a bad name by bringing
dreary death to thousands and millions of human beings-men,
women and children-before firing squads, through starvation
and freezing in arctic cold, in re-education centers, in gas chambers.
And yet, consistently pursued, the attempt to develop sciences
of man on a model approximating that of the natural sciences, to
elaborate structures of "natural laws" to account for recurrent aspects of human behavior has apparently won considerable tested
success in two fields at least-economics and linguistics.
And what of the kind of knowing about man that Sir
Matthew Hale, and, with a less alert consciousness of what he was
doing, Sir Edward Coke stood for? To describe that mode of
knowing effectively and to put an acceptable general name to it is
more difficult than to do so in the case of Hobbes. Still, I think it
can be argued that Matthew Hale was a proponent of a primarily
historical mode of knowing about man. He may have been the
first to espouse consciously an historical mode of knowing over
against a mode that was consciously rooted in the new natural sciences and that used them as its universal model in method. Indeed Hale could have had few predecessors, since Hobbes was the
first to universalize the scientific mode, and most of Hobbes' early
opponents were too busy being shocked by his conclusions to pay
much heed to his method.
The precise nature of the claim to knowing about humankind imbedded in Hale's discussion of reason of law is not easy to
pull free of its context and to state in terms wholly unambiguous
and non-contradictory, that is, to state as a set of axioms and of
legitimate inferences from them. With respect to the claims of
those who set considerable store by ways of knowing modo historico,
this difficulty has persisted to this day. 3 9 It is at least arguable

'9 Hale did little of the overclaiming that became an unpleasant and ultimately debilitating disorder of the historical sciences in the late nineteenth century: that, as was then
said, all sciences were dependent on history since all have had their development in a series
of particular historical contexts. It is the sort of claim that philosophers have taught me to
characterize as trivially true.
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that it will persist forever, if those whom we will call for short "the
historians" refuse to let themselves be pushed into defining their
claims within the boundaries set by the rhetoric of the natural
sciences. Despite this difficulty, the substance of the main claims
Hale made about the historical mode of knowing can, without
great violence to his general thinking, be derived from what he
says about reason of law, that is, about the right method for thinking coherently about a corpus of human social experiences that
has its own objective coherence. 4 ° In our present day vocabulary
this is what Hale seems to assert:
1. Reason gains access to a body of related social data historically constituted mainly by long and extensive immersion in it;
that is by long study of particulars and of their multiple relations
to other particulars.
2. The characteristic of mind most useful in such study is
not analytical deductive efficiency but erudite experienced alertness.
3. To interpret men's intentions expressed in their laws or in
any other source, it is necessary to know what the words those
men used meant to them. And that requires knowing the historical context of those words not only within a given document but
beyond it. It is precisely scholars possessed of erudite experienced
alertness who are most capable of effecting the entry into the
minds of men of other times and other climes, a necessity if one
would discern their meanings, aims, and intentions.
4. There is, of course, some overlap between the reason of
the natural sciences and the reason of the historical sciences. Historical scientists frequently deduce likely consequences of a historical
event and verify or falsify their understanding of the event by
checking on whether the consequences in fact followed. And
natural scientists familiarize themselves with a new scientific field
by immersing themselves in its "literature" to get the feel of it.
Nevertheless even the most scientifically oriented historical scientist operates at levels of deduction, mathematization and abstraction that are primitive compared with those employed in the advanced natural sciences. Many historical scientists attain eminence
11 In what follows I may occasionally use the phrase "historical sciences" and "historical
scientists." This is not with the purpose of assimilating the disciplines so named to Big Ess
Science, that is, to the natural sciences. It is with the opposite purpose, that of distinguishing them from the natural sciences as ways of knowing, while at the same time asserting
that they are ways of knowing, and for the entities they seek to know, appropriate ways of
knowing.
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and excellence in their fields of study without using numeric
techniques more advanced than those that a competent sixth
grader can manage.
5. Most important of all, Hale and the historical sciences he
foreshadowed restore time in its human dimension as a key element in the scientific study of man. In that study, up to the early
sixteenth century, as John Pocock has shown, dealings with experience, change, contingency and history-the offsprings of
time-varied from ambivalent and hesitant to negligible. 41 No
earlier philosopher, however, had more systematically and successfully denied temporality a significance in the essential order of
things than Hobbes did.
In Hobbes' political philosophy, there is no process; there are
only two fixed conditions-states of being linked by a transforming instant. There is the state of nature in which men live in a
state of war and constant dread of sudden death; there is the
instant of magical transformation, the instant of the covenant, in
which men surrender to a sovereign all their natural right to do
what they will; there is the civil state in which men do whatever
the sovereign bids them and live under his civil law in peace.4 2
Since all men live under sovereigns, their civil history marks only
the stupid slide of one polity or another away from peace and
sovereignty towards civil war and the state of nature.4 3
For Hobbes these truths owed nothing to an examination of
the record of the past, to a study of the bewildering and intricate
remains of the passage of men through time, to such prudence as
the experience of daily life or studious investigation of man's past
doings is said to impart. In Hobbes' view such experience did not
end in the agreement of minds attentive to the truth, as Galileo's
findings did, and as his own would have but for a mischance.
Men's minds had so long been numbed by a foolish trust in
history-that is, experience-and in the false philosophy of the
universities that they resisted scientific truth about man. Neither
of the latter ways of knowing, the ways of the lawyers and the
divines, rest on foundations that afford scientific certainty.
41 J.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975).

42 On the caution called for in speaking of the ahistoricity of Hobbes' outlook, see the
shrewd remarks of J.G.A. Pocock, in Time, History and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas
Hobbes, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 148 (1971).

43 That is what Behemoth is about, and almost all that it is about. It is not a coherent
account of a historical period of rapid change; it is a chronologically ordered series of
cautionary tales about what terrible things happen to society when people default on their
one paramount political obligation-their duty to do what the sovereign commands.
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On that premise Hale perfectly agreed with Hobbes. Reasoning about law by lawyers and judges did not yield the certainty
that reasoning about figures yielded geometers; the historical sciences do not reach the level of demonstrative certainty attainable
in the natural sciences. " From that premise, however, Hale proceeded to conclusions 180 degrees at variance to Hobbes'. To
Hobbes this shared premise pointed directly to the conclusion that
since the present unscientific way of reasoning about civil society
did not provide certainty, it was time to abandon that so-called
artificial-or as we would say, historical- reason of the law for
scientific reasoning that did provide it. Then questions of law
would be efficiently and promptly settled. For Hale, the lower
level of certainty was a consequence not of the reason of law but
of the intricacies of particular human actions that law as a historical science had to reason about. The laws of a land were what
they were because of particular historical circumstances. 4 5 To
understand them as well as possible, intrinsically and in relation to
each other, was not the work of mathematical reasoning but of
historical insight. If no single human mind could perfectly achieve
such insight, that was not the fault of the reason of law by which
it proceeded, but resulted from the very nature of human affairs.
Concerning the law, by a joint effort extending over the centuries,
men of law attained as much certainty as is attainable in the historical universe of human affairs. Hobbes' mistake, then-the

'" "[It is not possible for men to come to the Same Certainty, evidence and Demonstration touching (laws for the regulation and ordering of civil societies] as may be expected in Mathematicall Sciences . . " HALE, supra note 31, at 502. There is a language
problem here. It is not evident that the historical sciences should have as their objective the
statement of the kind of certainty that is the objective of the natural science of physics and
that is approximated by it. It is evident that the historical sciences start out at levels of
certainty in the domain of common sense that are inaccessible to the natural science of
meteorology or indeed any natural science. My effort to describe some of the differences
between the historical and the natural sciences in J. HEXTER, THE HISTORY PRIMER (1971)
may have just muddled the issues. Still, it would probably be useful to clear up the role of
the level of certainty in certifying a science as a natural science.
45 [W]ith relation to Lawes from a C~munitie, tho CE'mon Notion of Just
and fitt are common to all men of reason, Yett when Persons come to particular application of those Cmon Notions to particular Instances and occasions
wee shall rarely find a C~mon Consent or agreemt between men ....
...
[Tihat Men might understand by what rule and measure to live &
possess ... hath been ye prime reason, that the wiser Sort of the world have in
all ages agreed upon Some certaine Lawes and rules and methods of administration of C6"mon Justice ....
HALE, supra note 31, at 502-03.
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mistake, too, of his followers who try to import the natural science
model into the historical or human sciences-is simply that they
have gotten into the wrong universe: the universe of human affairs and historic time in which their sharpest tools go dull, in
which their best efforts can only quarry a small chip or two out of
vast blocks of granite-like evidence.
One final question. If the common lawyers presented so serious a threat to the theoretical structure Hobbes treasured, why
was he so long in confronting the threat? In the Leviathan he had
already taken casual note of the intellectual defects of Coke's
views on reason of law and briefly, yet effectively in his own eyes,
dealt with them. 4 6 Why then the racketty full-scale attack in the
Dialogue fifteen or twenty years later? Hobbes does not give us his
reasons for the delay. One can only venture an inference as to
what happened.
Perhaps it went like this. The decades of the 1640's and the
1650's had been a political nightmare for the English. They had
suffered two civil wars with the usual destruction and bloodshed.
They had seen their rightful king brought to the scaffold and
beheaded. They had been subjected to the rule of Commonwealth
men with no mandate to rule beyond the readiness of the victorious New Model Army to obey them. They had been subjected to
the naked power of the commander of that army, Oliver Cromwell. On his death they had seen sovereign power slide like a
greased pig out of the arms of one group after another that tried
to seize it as their native land reeled back toward civil war, anarchy, the state of nature. And all through, they had dinned in their
ears justifications of rebellion grounded on the claim that some
law of God or nature stood over the sovereign and made disobedience to his commands legitimate.
Well might Thomas Hobbes have believed in 1661 that his
fellow countrymen had learned their lesson; that, weary of the
incitement to rebellion of self-proclaimed men of religion, weary
of the rebellious marching of self-proclaimed armies of saints,
they would be ready to submit completely to the will of their undisputed sovereign, Charles II, by grace of God, King of England.
Beyond the recent experiences of Englishmen, which suggested
that they ought to think Hobbes' way, were their concrete actions
at the Restoration which suggested that they actually did think his
way. Their hatred of Commonwealthmen, their passionate avow46

LEVIATHAN,

supra note 3, at 176.
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als of loyalty to the King, their espousal of the doctrine of nonresistance-all these added up to a surge of will to civil peace and
an acceptance of the obligation to obey the sovereign that should
have made Englishmen ready to accept the new political science of
Hobbes.
But were they really ready? No, they were not, and it seems
to me that by the time he wrote the Dialogue, Hobbes knew they
were not. They were not ready because of something that had
happened to their minds in the preceding half century. In effect,
during that time one of the several standard circuits of political
response that Elizabethan Englishmen carried around in their
heads had been both highly sensitized and heavily reinforced so
that a relatively minor impulse would set the circuit going and the
surge of power toward it would damp down all the rest of the
political circuitry that moved Englishmen politically. a7
The political supercircuit that Englishmen carried around in
their heads by the 1660's was the one that, in their minds, inseparably linked the common law through the rule of law, reason
of law, and due process to the notion of due inheritance. By then
Englishmen had it firmly in mind that the common law not only
was the sole secure safeguard of their property, but that the law
itself was also an essential element in that property, the most precious legacy that their ancestors passed on to them. There was no
way that any large number of Englishmen would accept the view
that the common law was nothing but the command of the
sovereign, existing only by his will or sufferance. To them the law
was the body of rules, ancient yet modern, within whose bounds
they were free men. The law was indeed the King's, made by his
Parliaments, administered in his courts, declared by his judges.
The law, however, was also theirs, the firm foundation of their
liberties, the safeguard of their property, the ultimate warranty to
them of all that was their own, and, if it was effectively to be those
things, necessarily binding on the ruler as well as the ruled.
By the 1660's Englishmen had the political experience and
thereby developed the political instincts that enabled them to sniff
out and set themselves against all measures that delivered their
liberties into the discretion of the executive. Executive suspension
of laws, executive tampering with the tenure of judges, a military
force at the free disposal of the king, executive delay in showing
17 A recent example of an event tripping a circuit like that described in the text with
consequences as there described was the Saturday Night Massacre of October 20, 1973.
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cause for the arrest of men imprisoned, executive intrusion of
certain men into military, civil and ecclesiastical offices from
which they in particular were barred by law-any such actions or
arrangements brought on first a quick antagonistic response from
the section of the population most immediately affected by it, and
then hasty retraction by the government from its overextended
position. In one instance, from 1685 to 1688, the executive did
not retract but acted as if it were indeed a Hobbesian sovereign.
At that point the deeply imprinted intuitions of Englishmen about
liberty and the rule of law, their political supercircuit, took over
completely. They covered their abandonment of non-resistance
with the diaphanous fiction of James II's abdication, and
demonstrated-to the astonishment, no doubt, of any Hobbesian
onlookers-that English subjects could dispose of their sovereign
with far less threat to the public peace than support for a
sovereign who ruled as if he was not under the law would cause.
Indeed, regardless of its significance in theory, the Glorious Revolution, so called, of 1688, unmistakably demonstrated that the
English sovereign was under a law so fundamental that it was
beyond the power of any ruler of the land permanently to alter it.
This brings us to a persistent and minor perplexity about the
past 150 years of the history of Britain. In jurisprudential
perspective the land has been ruled at least that long by a
sovereign Parliament cut to the specifications of Thomas Hobbes.
Parliament is a sovereign with no juridical bounds whatever to its
power, a sovereign whose corporate words are law, whatever
words it chooses to speak. Yet in no land has the sovereign more
assiduously and consistently maintained fundamental laws ensuring the liberty of the citizen or subject. No one knows what would
happen if Britain's sovereign Parliament assiduously and consistently with full right set about abrogating those fundamental laws.
No one knows because the sovereign Parliament has never set
about abrogating those laws in Britain. Perhaps it has never
wanted to; perhaps it has never dared to; but in any case, it never
has. In fact, in a world wildly changed since the 1600's, the supercircuit that got into the collective political consciousness of Englishmen then has dominated it ever since. Whatever jurisprudential theory says, we know, as Coke did, that in England the
sovereign is not under man but under the law, in 1980 as in 1607,
and possibly even more so. Despite appearances, by 1670, Coke
had won in the world of English politics; Hobbes had lost. And
when he wrote the Dialogue Hobbes may have suspected as much.

